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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM B. MASON, 
Plaintiff wnd Respondent, 
vs. 
\VAYNE N. ~fASON, 
Defendant and Appella.nt. 
APPELI_jANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
rrhe following facts are admitted by both parties: 
The government of the United States was the owner of 
a single unit of land located near the foothills of th0 
Wasatch Range near Plymouth, Box Elder County, lltah 
'vhi'Ch was composed of thirteen subdivisions aggregat-
ing 540.16 acres. Under the authority of Section 2-l-55 
of the Revised Statutes, as arnended ( 43 USC, 1946 Ed. 
Supp. 4, Section 1171) the government offered this land 
for public sale. The sale was held on September 28, 
1949 and defendant purchased the entire tract. Within 
the time allowed by law, plaintiff who clairned to be the 
O\Vner of contiguous lands, and defendant, vvho also 
claimed to he the owner of contiguous lands, hoth a~sPrt-
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ed p·referential right to purchase this isolated tract. As 
the preference right claimants, plaintiff and defendant 
failing to agree respecting the division of the isolated 
tract between them, the matter· was referred to the 
regional administrator of the Colorado-Utah· region, 
Bureau of Land 1\{anagement. On April 10, 1950 he de-
termined that defendant should he permitted to purchase 
the one subdivision (the Southeast Quarter, Northwest 
Quarter of Section 35, Township 14 North, Range 3 West, 
Salt Lake ~Ieridian) of the isolated tract to which his 
privately owned land· is contiguous and that plaintiff 
should be permitted to purchase the twelve other sub-
divisions of the isolated tract. Upon the basis of the 
region administrator's determination, the manager of the 
land and survey office at Salt Lake City, on April 13, 
1950, issued a formal decision apportioning the isolated 
tract between the preference rights claimants in the 
twelve and one manner indicated by the regional admin-
istrator. Both of the preference rights claimants there-
upon took appeals to the director of the Bureau of Land 
Management. Plaintiff contended that the entire isolated 
tract should have been apportioned to him. Defendant 
contended that at least one l1alf of the isolated tract 
should have been apportioned to him. On September 12, 
1950 the assistant director of the Bureau of Land Man-
agen•ent affir1ned the apportionment of the tract pre-
viously made by the manager pursuant to the regional 
administrator's determination. Defendant then appealed 
to the S·ecretary of the Interior. Plaintiff did not take a 
further app~eal, although he was served with a copy of 
defendant's appeal, and he filed no response thereto. 
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On April 2, 1952, the Secretary of the Interior, by 
Masten G. White, Solicitor, handed down a decision 
reversing the two previous decisions and holding that 
under Section 2455 of the revised statutes as amended, 
the isola ted tract should be divided between the respec-
tive parties on the following basis: Six of said subdivi-
sions to defendant and seven to plaintiff and pursuant 
thereto, the United States, on the 5th day of De'Cember, 
1952, issued its patent to the defendant to the six sub-
divisions described as Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35, all in 
'l1o\vnship 14 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
and like,vise, issued a patent to the plaintiff to the re-
Inaining seven subdivisions of the isolated tract. No 
appeal or writ of review of any kind was taken by plain-
tiff to review the decision of the Secretary of the Interior. 
In support of the foregoing facts, see Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 10; Defendant's Exhibit No. 8 and Findings num-
bered 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The court by its Conclusion of 
Law No. 1, found that both plaintiff and defendant held 
preferential rights to purchase the isolated tra~cts offered 
by the government under the provisions of Section 2455, 
Revised Statutes, as an1ended, ( 43 USCA, 1171). 
Notwithstanding the decision entered by the Depart-
ment of the Interior, the court proceeded to take evirlenre 
for the purpose apparently of determining whether or 
not the decision of the Secretary of the lnterior should be 
affirmed and after the hearing, upon the evidence sub-
n1itted by both sides, the trial court, in its Finding No. 
8, found fro1n the evidence presented in court that it was 
not Pquitable within the 1nean1ng of thP statute, ( -t-:1 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
USC, 1201), to apportion, rmder the facts of this case, 
the lands to be sold on an equal basis and the trial court 
determined that an equitable division would require the 
awarding to p~ain tiff all of the en tire tract, except only 
Lots 4 and 5, and the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 35. See Finding No. 8. And as a con-
clusion of law, the court found that the D·epartment of 
Interior erroneously interpreted the statute and the 
court thereupon found as a Conclusion of Law that the 
defendant holds in trust for the plaintiff three of the 
Forty-acre tracts which should have been equitably allo-
cate·d and awarded to plaintiff. See Conclusions of Law 
No. 2 and No. 4. The court thereupon entered its decree 
in equity ordering the defendant, upon being reimbursed 
for the costs of the lands in question, to convey to the 
plaintiff the additional tracts of land. 
The result arrived at then is as follows: Out of the 
thirteen original isolated tracts, the S.ecretary of the In-
terior awarded plaintiff seven. Of the six remaining, 
the court awarded plaintiff· three more, which in effect 
gave plaintiff ten of the isolated forty-acre tracts and 
the defendant three. The defendant appeals from this 
decision, con tending that this decision, under the facts 
and the law, is erroneous and that the defendant should 
be entitled to be decreed the six isolated tracts which 
were awarded to him by the Secretary of the Interior. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. Did the District Court have jurisdiction in 
this ease1 
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Point 2. If a District Court does have jurisdiction, 
\vha.t is the scope of the review? 
Point 3. In any event, a court should not set aside 
a decision of the Department of Interior, unless it ap-
pears frorn the record made on appeal to the Depart-
rnent of the Inte·rior that said department either: 
A. Committed an abuse of discretion; or 
B. ~Tisinterpreted and misconstrued the law. 
Point 4. That the evidence presented in this case 
does not support the Findings, Conclusion of Law and 
Decree that the defendant holds title in trust to the three 
isolated tracts of land. 
We shall discuss these questions in the order sug-
gested in the foregoing statement of points: 
ARGUMENT 
J>oint 1. DID THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE 
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE? As heretofore noted, 
the plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the De-
partment of the Interior. On the contrary, he stood idly 
by until after the patent to the tracts in question had been 
issued by the government and then he corn1nenced thi8 
suit in the District Court seeking to irnpress a trust upon 
this property. It n1akes little difference what you call 
this proceeding. After all, it is in the nature of an appeal 
from the decision of the Secretary of the Interior on mat-
ters relating to public lands; or, if it is not an appeal, 
it is an atteu1pted collateral attack on the final decision 
of the land deparhnent. I know of no federal statute 
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which vests in state 'courts jurisdiction to hear or deter-
rnine ap.peals from the ·decision o'f the Dep,artment of the 
Interior. I recognize that there are cases which hold that 
where a citizen goes upon the -public domain, takes pos-
session of the property, puts improvements thereupon 
and thereby obtains an equitable interest in the property 
that an action may lie in the state court to impress the 
property with a trust. In this case, however, plaintiff was 
never in possession of the property. He placed no im-
provements thereon and the question presented to the 
Department of the Interior was how to divide the isolated 
tract equitably between two contiguous land owners. 
The Secretary of the Interior made that division as he 
was required to do under the law and we contend that 
having made such a decision in the absence of fraud, and 
in the absence of an appeal through the proper channels 
to the p·rop·er court, that the decision of the Secretary 
of the Interior is final and binding upon the court. 
We think the following ·cases support our position: 
Maddox vs. Burnham, 156 U.S. 544; 
Sanders vs. Dutcher, Cal. 187 Pac. 51-187 Pac. 51 
Davis vs. F·en, 211 Pac·. 30; 
U. S. vs. Mcintosh, Utah, 85 Fed. 333; 
Martin vs. Bartmus~ Cal. 207 Pac. 550. 
A·ppellant filed a Inotion to dismiss the complaint. 
Ail of the matters are sufficiently covered by the alle-
gations of the complaint, to which are attached the vari-
ous exhibits including the decision of the Department of 
Interior, so that the n1atter was squarely presented to the 
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court. Objections were also raised to the introduction 
of evidence so that the issue is squarely presented to this 
court as to whether or not, under the facts alleged, this 
complaint stated a cause of action or whether or not the 
District Court had jurisdiction to review the decision 
as rendered, which in effect is what the plaintiff was 
asking the court to do. 
Point 2. IF THE DIS.TRICT COURT DO·ES 
HAVE JURISDICTION, WHAT IS THE sc·o·PE OF 
THE REVIEW~ If the court did have jurisdiction to 
hear this matter, and if the complaint does state a cause 
of action, then the next question to be determined is this : 
What was the scope of the inquiry which could be made 
by the District Court~ We contend that the only question 
which the District Court 'could determine was whether 
or not on the record which was filed with the Department 
of the Interior, the rulirng of the Department of the In.-
terior was erroneous. We quote from the decision: 
"The record in this case does not reveal any per-
suasive reason for departing from the ordinary 
rule of apportioning subdivisions among prefer-
ence right claimants on the basis of equality as far 
as possible." 
Further on we again quote from the decision wherein it 
discusses the evidence ;vhich was presented at the vari-
ous hearings : 
"There was no indication in the determination, 
however, regarding the relationship between the 
apportionment provided for in it and the nature 
of the isolated tract or the use each api)licant 
makes of his own lands together with the land 
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in the isolated tract; and the record does not con-
tain any ~upplementary reports or other written 
data tend1ng to explain why these particular fac-
tors were regarded as sufficient to warrant a 
departure i~ the. present case from the ordinary 
rule pres'cr1bed 1n 43 CFR 250.11 (h) (3)." 
rl 1he decision then proceeds to analyze the other factor 
as revealed by the record with regard to the difference 
in the amount of land owned by plaintiff and defendant 
and the decision then says: 
"However, the fact that William B. Mason owns a 
substantially greater acreage of contigious land 
than Wayne N. Mason does not, ipso facto, take 
this case outside the ordinary rule of equal appor-
tionment as far as possible * * * In this coooec-
tion, it is to be noted that neither section 2455 
of the Revised Statutes nor the pertinent d'epa,rt-
Jnental regula.tion ntentions the degree of con-
tiguity as a factor affectin.Q the apportionment of 
an isolated tract arnong competing preference 
right claimants." 
In the trial of this case before the District Court, 
the plaintiff, over the objection of the defendant, was 
per1nitted to testify at so1ne length as to matters which 
were clearlr outside the record as presented to the De-
partment of Interior and he attempted to supply evi-
deneP 'vhich \vas clearly absent from the record presented 
to the Department of Interior. As we understand it. 
the scope of the inquiry contended for by plaintiff is a 
judicial detern1ination of whether or not the- Secretary 
of the Interior 1nisconstrued the fa'Cts and 1nade an er-
roneous division of the tract. It is difficult for us to 
underHtand how the court could receive and consider 
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evidence which was never presented to the Department 
of the Interior in an atte·mpt to prove that the Depart--
ment of the Interior erroneously construed facts which 
were never presented to him. We contend, therefore, 
that if the court did have jurisdiction and if the com-
plaint does state a cause of action, yet the court in ex-
amining the matter should he limited to considering the 
record as actually presented to the Department of the 
Interior and not be permitted to offer evidence beyond 
the record when the scope of the inquiry is limited to the 
question of whether or not the D·epartment of Interior 
misconceived the facts as presented to him. 
Point 3. IN ANY EVENT, A COURT S.HOULD 
NOT ·sET ASIDE A DE·CISION ·OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF INTERIOR, UNLESS IT APPEARS FROM 
THE RECORD MADE ON APPEAL TO THE DE.-
PARTMENT O·F THE IN·TERIOR THAT SAID DE-
p ART1\iENT EITHER: 
A. COMMITTED AN ABUS.E OF' DISCRETION; 
OR 
B. MISINTERPRETED AND MISC·ONSTRUED 
THE LAW. 
It is universally held that, 
"In case of contest the finding of fact hy the Conl-
Inission of Inspector examined on final appeal by 
the Se'Cretary of the Interior are binding upon the 
courts in the absence of gross mistake or fraud 
and the judicial inquiry is limited to determining 
whethe-r it is clear error of law that resulted in 
awarding the right of purchase and ultimately 
issuing the patent to the wrong party.'' 
9 
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Johnson vs. Riddle, 240 U.S. 467; 
United States vs. Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints, 101 F'. 2nd, 156; 
Ruberoid Company vs. F·ederal Trade Coin-
mission, 96 Law Edition 73'2 · 
' ' 
Script Howard Radio, Inc., vs. Federal Coin-
Inunieations Comm., 316 U.S. 4; 
J a1nieson vs. James, 100 Pac. 700; 
Friedman vs. Schwellenback, U.S. Court of 
Appeals, District of Columbia; 
United States vs. Federal Maritime Board 
96 Law Ed., 390. 
T t is also established that, 
~'long continued administrative interpretations of 
law is entitled to great weight." 
Amirikon vs. United States, U.S .. District Ct. 
of ~1aryland, 100 F. Suppl. 2~3. 
In the opinion and order of the Secretary of the 
Interior, we find the following: 
H The basic depart1nental policy expressed in the 
~eeond sentence of this portion of the regulation 
is that the subdivisions included in an isolated 
tra.·ct a.re ordinarily to be divided equally among 
co1np·eting preference right claiinants, if this is 
possible in vie"\\r of the nu1nber of subdivisions 
and the nun1ber of such clai1nants; and that where 
an equal apportionn1ent cannot be accompHshed 
bee a use of an odd nu1nber of subdivisions in rela-
tion to the nu1nber of preference right ·claimants, 
the apportion1uen t shall be as close as possible to 
the ~tnndard of equalit~T." 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In other words, at the time that this decision was render-
ed on April 2, 1952, the policy of the Dep·artment of In-
terior for a long time previous thereto had been to ap·por-
tion the isolated tracts equally if possible between abut-
ting owners. That policy was followed in this case and 
the odd tract was given to the p·laintiff because he initi-
ated the claim to a preferential right at the time this 
de·cision was made. See, 
.245 Revised Statutes, as amended. 
"It shall be lawful for the Secretary of the In-
terior to order into market and to sell at public 
auction any isolated or disconnected tract or par-
cel of the public domain, not exceeding 1520 acres, 
which in his judgment it would be proper to ex-
pose for sale, provided that for a period of not 
less than thirty days· after the highest bid has 
been re·ceived, any owner or owners of contiguous 
land shall have a preference right to buy the of-
fered lands at such highest bid price and where 
two or more persons apply to exercise such p·refer-
ence right, the Secretary of the Interior is au-
thorized to make an equitable division of the land 
among such applicants." 
It is to be noted that a fair degree of discretion is vested 
in the Secretary of the Interior in first ordering the 
land to be sold and secondly in making a division of the 
land among owners of contiguous land. At the time of 
this decision, the foregoing statutory provision was 
implemented by the following relevant portion of 43 
CFR 250.11 (b) (3): 
"Where there is a conflict between two or more 
persons claiming a pTeference right of purchase, 
they will be allowed thirty days from receipt of 
11 
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-notice· within which to agree an1ong theu1selvt.l~ 
upon a division of the tracts in conflict by sub-
divisions. In the absence of an agreement the 
regional administrator will1nake a determination 
equitably apportioning the various subdivisions 
a1nong the claimants, ordinarily so as to equalize 
as nearly as possible the tracts they sho~dd be 
be permitted to purchase. * * *" 
It seems to us that the foregoing language can mean 
nothing else except that in 'Case of two or more claimants 
desiring to p:urchase it was the declared policy of the 
department to divide equally as nearly as possible the 
tracts of land each should be p~ermitted to purchase, ir-
respective of the amount of land each contiguous owner 
might own in his own right. 
Counsel relies upon Title 43, Chapter 1, Sec. 250.11 
(b) (3) as now amended. This was amended on June 4, 
1953, n1ore than a year after the decision in question was 
rendered. As now a1nended, the foregoing statute adds 
the follo\ving pertinent provisions: 
"In the absence of an agreement, an equitable 
division of the land will be 1nade, taking into con-
sideration such factors as: 
., 1. The equalizing of the number of acres 
which each claimant will be permitted to 
p:urchase, 
"2. Desirable land use based on topography 
land pattern location of water and simi-
lar factors ; and 
"3. Legitimate historical use including con-
struction and maintenance of authorized 
in1 prove men ts, 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if considerations dictate all o'f the subdivisions 
may be awarded to one of the claimants.'' 
It is well established that a subsequent law passed after 
the rights had accrued and the legal title had passed is 
not op·erative to divest such legal or enlarge as against 
such title any equitable rights which the defendant there-
after had. 
Maddox vs. Burnham, 156 U.S .. 544. 
This question must be decided on the law as it existe~d 
at the time of the decision supplemented by rules of in-
terpretation adopted by the department and in long use. 
The key words governing the duty of the department as 
defined in the act itself are: 
''equitably apportioning and to equalize as near-
ly as possible the tracts." 
The word "equitably" has been defined to mean fairly, 
justly and impartially. See, 
Words and Phrases, Vol. 15, Pages 3, 4, and 5, 
and cases cited. 
The key word in the statute "equalize" as defined in, 
Words and Phrases, Vol. 14A, Page 439. 
is as follows: 
"To make equal. To ·cause to correspond or be like 
in amount or degree as compared with something." 
See the following cases: 
Los Angeles County vs. Ransohoff, 74 P. 2nd, 828 
DeMille vs. Los Angeles County, 77 P. 2nd, 905; 
Wells F·argo and Comp·any vs. State Boa.rd, 56 
Cal. 194. 
It would seen1, therefore, that the duty imposed upon 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the depart1uent w·as to divide these tracts equally runong 
the preference claimants in a manner that was fair, just 
and in1partial but leaving the procedure in affecting this 
equitable settlement to the discretion of the departlnent. 
It is further noted that in the opinion of the department 
it is stated that it is the basic policy of the department 
\vhich is being ·carried out. From this it would seem to 
be an interpretation of the statute of long standing. If 
such is true, if the courts have any right at all, they 
should be very careful in substituting their o'vn interpre-
tation of the statute for that of the administrative agency. 
See, 
Amirikon vs. United States, U.S. District Court of 
Maryland, 100 F·. Suppl. 263; 
Peck vs. Greyhound Corporation, 93 F. 'Suppl. 679. 
We say, therefore, that the apportionment as made by 
the department 'vas both fair and equitable in light of the 
interpretation and policy adopted by the department 
under the statute. 
Point 4. THAT ·THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FIND-
INGS., CON·CLUSION OF. LAW AND DEC·REE THAT 
TI-IE DE:B-,·ENDANT HOijDS TITLE IN TRUST TO 
THE ~PHREE ISOLATED TR.ACTS OF' LAND. Final-
l~T' \\re eon tend that even though the court was right in 
per1nitting the plaintiff to introduce evidence concerning 
the Inatters covered by the festi1nony, yet under this evi-
dence the decision of the lower eourt is manifestly er-
roneous. \V e contend first that the number of acres 
owned by each contiguous owner is of no importance 
whatsoever. The whole policy of the homestead law from 
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its inception was to. provide a method whereby citizens 
could acquire land on the public domain. It was never 
the policy to prefer or even encourage the acquisition of 
large tracts of land by one person. If the number of acres 
owned by each is controlling, then the bigger the com-
pany's or individual holdings would determine his or its 
rights to gobble up the public domain and squeeze the 
little fellow out completely. The evidence in this case 
shows that some years ago the defendant filed a home-
stead on this land and it was his bona fide intention to 
ho1nestead the san1e. l-Ie erected fences within the area. 
In addition to this the defendant has the right to graze 
twenty seven head of cattle on the national forest. These 
isolated tracts adjoin this national forest and the iso-
lated tracts are valuable for early Spring and late :B..,all 
grazing before cattle can be turned on the national forest. 
The plaintiff owns no rights whatsoever in the national 
forest. The defendant has for many years leased Section 
36 from the ·state of Utah and the State of Utah has now 
announced that it intended to offer this section of land 
for sale. Defendant will thereby be given an option equal 
to that of plaintiff to purchase this section which adjoins 
the national forest on the south and the isolated tracts on 
the east. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. It is difficult for us 
to see how it can be contended that the awarding to plain-
tiff of ten of said tracts and the awarding to defendant 
of only three tracts can be said to be an equitable appor-
tioninent of the lands or to equalize as nearly as possible 
the tracts. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is appellant's contention that the 
decision of the Secretary of the Interior apportioning 
the land between plaintiff and defendant was strictly 
in a'Ccordance with the law, the rules which had been es-
tablished hy the department and the pTocedure which it 
had followed over many years; that the court cannot con-
sider the provisions of the amended act passed in 1953 ; 
that the ruling of the dep~artment was fair and just; that 
the dep-artment equitably apportioned the land equalizing 
it as nearly as possible but gave to the plaintiff the one 
extra subdivision; that in doing so the department acted 
in good faith; that his decision is supported by the law 
as it existed at that time; that the trial court was power-
less to reverse, modify· or change this decision; that this 
de-cree should be reversed and judgment should be en-
tered dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG, THA·TCHER & GLASMANN, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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